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1295 
MONITORED DISCLOSURE: A WAY TO AVOID 
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY IN REDISTRICTING 
LITIGATION 
Mark Tyson 
Abstract: The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution protects members of 
Congress from testifying about “legislative acts” or having “legislative acts” used against 
them as evidence. U.S. Supreme Court decisions delineating the scope of what constitutes a 
“legislative act” have an episodic feel and have failed to create a readily applicable test for 
new factual scenarios. One such scenario occurs when members of Congress communicate 
with state legislators regarding congressional redistricting. Courts must know how to handle 
instances where members of Congress assert legislative privilege in the redistricting context, 
and specifically when members of Congress assert the privilege in an effort to prevent 
disclosure of documentary material. Instead of resorting to the traditional “legislative acts” 
test, courts should permit disclosure of written materials subject to the rules of discovery. 
Courts should be vigilant in reviewing discovery requests to ensure that plaintiffs are not 
unduly burdening members of Congress, thereby unnecessarily distracting them from their 
work. 
INTRODUCTION 
[Members of Congress] shall in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest 
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective 
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for 
any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.1 
 
Our speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve 
legislative independence, not its supremacy.2 
 
The Speech or Debate Clause creates a privilege for members of 
Congress from revealing information about “legislative acts.”3 The 
Clause has been both praised as essential to the independence of the 
legislature, in that it shields legislators from executive and judicial 
                                                     
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
2. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972). 
3. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615–18 (1972). 
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harassment,4 and criticized as a screen behind which misbehaving 
legislators may escape the usual legal consequences of their actions.5 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to create a 
testimonial privilege that protects members of Congress from testifying 
regarding “legislative acts.”6 However, the circuit courts have split on 
the question of whether the Clause also contains a nondisclosure 
privilege.7 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to furnish an answer. 
What the U.S. Supreme Court has done is to construe the scope of the 
privilege.8 Before 1972, the privilege was applied broadly.9 But in 1972, 
the Court narrowed the privilege’s scope significantly in the seminal 
case of Gravel v. United States.10 In spite of Gravel’s narrowing effect, 
subsequent cases applying Gravel’s test have an episodic feel. The U.S. 
Supreme Court will likely not conduct a fact-specific inquiry11 and will 
not examine a Congressperson’s motive.12 But beyond that, much of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance has come in dicta and has not proved 
very useful in new contexts and fresh factual scenarios.13 
One new context is redistricting. Redistricting takes place every ten 
years14 with the goal of “realign[ing] a legislative district’s boundaries to 
reflect changes in population.”15 Congressional redistricting must adhere 
to a strict “one person, one vote” requirement.16 But even within this 
                                                     
4. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179−81 (1966). 
5. See Léon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech: Its Origin, Meaning and 
Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960, 970−72 (1951). 
6. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. 
7. Compare United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), with 
United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012). A 
nondisclosure privilege means that the Executive or other litigant cannot review evidence that may 
contain a legislative act unless a legislator consents to the search. A.J. Green, Note, United States v. 
Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or Debate Clause to Fight Corruption in Congress Post-Rayburn, 
2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 501 (2012). 
8. See generally infra Part I.  
9. See infra Part I.C. 
10. 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
11. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 339 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
12. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951). 
13. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10 (1979) (stating in dictum that the 
Speech or Debate Clause would not protect attempts to influence executive agencies). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (9th ed. 2009). 
16. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). “One person, one vote” describes the equal 
district population requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Laughlin McDonald, The 
Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for 
Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 243 (2009). 
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stricture, there is a risk that redistricting bodies will use impermissible 
criteria—such as impermissible racial criteria—to redraw district lines. 
After the 2010 redistricting cycle, a group of Texas Latino voters 
initiated suit against the Texas congressional and legislative redistricting 
plan alleging that the redistricting decision makers had impermissibly 
used racial animosity as a redistricting criteria.17 In an effort to prove 
these allegations, the plaintiffs sought to discover written 
communications between members of the United States Congress and 
members of the Texas State Legislature.18 The members of Congress 
made a motion for nondisclosure, arguing that legislative privilege 
barred the plaintiffs from discovering their correspondence.19 However, 
a Texas district court denied the motion and allowed the plaintiffs to 
discover the correspondence.20 This case raises important questions 
regarding both the actual scope of the privilege generally and the 
appropriate scope of the privilege in the redistricting context 
specifically. 
Although the modern articulation of the privilege as delineated by 
Gravel does not bar discovery in Perez v. Texas,21 it is easy to foresee 
members of Congress using different arguments based on Congress’s 
broad grant of authority to regulate redistricting as a method of 
protecting future correspondence from being discovered.22 This is 
important because redistricting plaintiffs who allege racial 
gerrymandering already face a difficult burden to show intent.23 If future 
plaintiffs were cut off from discovering information like the written 
correspondence in Perez v. Texas, members of Congress and 
redistricting bodies generally would be insulated from scrutiny by 
private litigants. The public profits immensely from “private attorney 
                                                     
17. See Plaintiff Texas Latino Redistricting Task Forces Response to Defendants Motion for 
Protective Order at 5, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. July 29, 2011) 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Response]. 
18. Order at 7, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2011). 
19. Motion of Congresspersons Lamar Smith, Joe Barton, Louis Gohmert, Ted Poe, Samuel 
Johnson, Ralph Hall, Jeb Hensarling, John Culberson, Kevin Brady, Michael McCaul, Michael 
Conaway, Kay Granger, William Thornberry, Ronald Paul, Bill Flores, Randy Neugebauer, Pete 
Olson, Francisco Canseco, Kenny Marchant, Michael Burgess, Blake Farenthold, John Carter and 
Pete Sessions to Prevent Disclosure of Written Communications Subject to Privilege Under the 
Speech and Debate Clause, United States Constitution, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-
XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Motion to Prevent Disclosure]. 
20. Order, supra note 18. 
21. Order, supra note 18. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 899, 921 (2001). 
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generals,”24 and losing that private check in the redistricting context 
would be a heavy blow not only to individual rights, especially for 
minority voters, but also to transparency in government generally. 
For those reasons and others this Comment will explain below, at 
least in the redistricting context, the legislative privilege should not 
include an absolute nondisclosure privilege. Part I of this Comment 
describes the Speech or Debate clause generally. Part II outlines 
Congress’s authority to govern redistricting and explains redistricting 
requirements. Part III describes Perez v. Texas. Part IV details how the 
Perez court’s reasoning could harm future redistricting plaintiffs. Part V 
asserts that the Speech or Debate Clause should not contain an absolute 
nondisclosure privilege. Finally, Part VI argues that the Perez v. Texas 
court reached the right result but for the wrong reasons, and that courts 
in the future should eschew the “legislative acts” test in redistricting 
cases in favor of applying normal discovery rules to protect members of 
Congress from harassment and distraction. 
I. THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE: HISTORY, PURPOSE, 
AND SCOPE 
The Speech or Debate Clause confers both immunity and privilege on 
members of Congress for “legislative acts.”25 The purpose behind the 
Clause is to protect the legislature from other branches of government.26 
Thus, courts have applied the Clause to both civil and criminal actions. 
During the first several hundred years of the Clause’s existence, the U.S. 
Supreme Court construed it broadly.27 However, in the 1970s, the Court 
narrowed what constitutes a “legislative act.”28 While the Court’s test 
narrowed the scope of “legislative acts,” it did not resolve all 
ambiguities, including a question over which the circuit courts have 
split: specifically, whether the Clause contains a nondisclosure 
                                                     
24. See Carl Cheng, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1929, 1931 (1985). “The private attorney general doctrine provides for the enforcement of 
public rights through the use of private lawsuits.” Id. at 1929 n.1. 
25. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312−13 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 
(1972). 
26. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617. 
27. See Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125, 131 
(1973). 
28. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624–26; see Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative 
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1973); Brewster, Gravel, 
and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 146; Matthew R. Walker, Constitutional Law—
Narrowing the Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause Immunity, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 377, 388−90 
(1995). 
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privilege.29 Additionally, nearly all of the states have adopted some 
version of the Clause;30 however, many have interpreted the Clause even 
more narrowly than the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation.31 This 
section will survey the past and current state of Speech or Debate Clause 
jurisprudence as a way to feature the areas in which future application is 
in doubt. 
A.  The Speech or Debate Clause Creates Both an Immunity and a 
Privilege 
Article I, Section 6 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “for any 
Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of Congress] shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.”32 According to well-settled and long-
standing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Clause immunizes members 
of Congress and their aides from criminal or civil liability for all acts 
“within ‘the legislative sphere,’ even though their conduct, if performed 
in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or 
otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes.”33 The Clause also 
contains a testimonial and evidentiary privilege that shields members of 
Congress from testifying about legislative acts or having legislative acts 
used against them as evidence.34 The Clause has been both praised as 
essential to the independence of the legislature in that it shields 
legislators from executive and judicial harassment,35 and criticized as a 
screen behind which misbehaving legislators may escape the usual legal 
consequences of their actions.36 In some cases, the Clause will conceal 
                                                     
29. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rayburn House 
Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir 2007) (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
30. Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 221 (2004). 
31. Id. at 236–37. 
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Clause was based on a similar provision from England. 
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975). However, the American Speech or 
Debate Clause is more expansive than its progenitor. See id. (“English history does not totally 
define the reach of the Clause.”); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) 
(arguing that the privilege “must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the 
context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary 
system”). 
33. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312−13 (1973) (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624−25 
(citations omitted)). 
34. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487 (1979) (evidentiary privilege); Gravel, 408 U.S. 
at 616 (testimonial privilege). 
35. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178−81 (1966). 
36. See Yankwich, supra note 5, at 970−72. 
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and protect misconduct,37 yet it has been acknowledged that this 
consequence is inevitable if the Clause is to serve its fundamental 
purpose.38 
B.  The Clause’s Purpose Is to Preserve Legislative Independence, and 
Courts Have Applied It to Both Civil and Criminal Actions 
Historically, the Clause’s fundamental purpose was to free the 
legislature from executive and judicial oversight that threatens 
legislative independence.39 The Court has been willing to go beyond the 
actual text of the Clause in order to effectuate this purpose.40 But the 
Court has made clear that the Clause was meant to preserve legislative 
independence—not to establish legislative supremacy.41 Additionally, 
the Clause is meant to protect the “functioning of Congress,” not the 
reputation of its members.42 Courts applying the Clause are tasked with 
doing so in a manner that will ensure Congress’s independence without 
elevating it at the expense of the other two branches.43 
The language of the Clause does not differentiate between civil 
actions brought by individuals and criminal actions brought by the 
executive branch.44 The U.S. Supreme Court has established that the 
Clause immunizes members of Congress from civil actions seeking 
redress for individual rights violations.45 These decisions indicate that 
the Clause applies equally in cases initiated by the executive and in cases 
brought by private citizens.46 A private civil action “creates a distraction 
                                                     
37. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 521. 
38. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1170. Professor Reinstein and Silverglate 
acknowledge that wrongdoing may go unpunished because courts will refuse to find jurisdiction 
over the offense and the legislature will fail to discipline its misbehaving member. Id. 
39. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618. 
40. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516 (“Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be read 
broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch, but no 
more than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to make Members of Congress super-citizens, 
immune from criminal responsibility.”); John C. Raffetto, Balancing the Legislative Shield: The 
Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 883, 889−90 (2010).  
41. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508. 
42. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
43. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508. 
44. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1171. 
45. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84−85 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367, 376 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201−05 (1881). 
46. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1172. However, Professor Reinstein and 
Silverglate argue that the privilege’s scope should not be coterminous in cases initiated by the 
executive and in cases brought by private citizens. They argue for what they dub a “functional 
approach” which “views the privilege as evolving dynamically in response to changing 
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and forces members to divert their time, energy, and attention from 
legislative tasks to defend the litigation.”47 Private civil actions can also 
be used to “delay and disrupt” the legislative process.48 And in the 
modern era, civil actions brought by private parties may be an even more 
significant threat to legislative independence than criminal investigations 
and charges initiated by the executive branch.49 
Without the Clause protecting members of Congress, litigants could 
disrupt the legislative process by using civil discovery.50 Civil discovery 
threatens to have a chilling effect on the business of legislators, 
including whether they choose to exchange views on legislative activity. 
According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit: 
[E]xchanges between a Member of Congress and the Member’s 
staff or among Members of Congress on legislative matters may 
legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the 
possibility of compelled disclosure may therefore chill the 
exchange of views with respect to legislative activity. This chill 
runs counter to the Clause’s purpose of protecting against 
disruption of the legislative process.51 
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that even though a 
private civil action does not implicate the executive branch in separation 
                                                     
governmental functions in order to fulfill the historic purpose of the privilege—the preservation of 
legislative independence in a system of separation of powers.” Id. at 1121. This approach would 
limit the privilege’s scope in cases brought by private citizens where separation of powers was not 
at issue. Id. at 1122. But see Huefner, supra note 30, at 273 n.206. Professor Huefner disagrees with 
Professor Reinstein and Silverglate, stating that “not only is there no textual basis” for 
distinguishing between civil and criminal actions, historically, “the privilege also is much more 
amenable to application to private charges than Reinstein and Silverglate suggest.” Id.  
47. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). 
48. Id.  
49. Huefner, supra note 30, at 274. Professor Huefner examines the article written by Reinstein 
and Silverglate and concludes that “[t]heir resulting willingness to abandon the protections of the 
legislative privilege in civil actions in part may have reflected an earlier era, in which rampant 
private lawsuits against politicians for their legislative activities may not have been as certain as 
they would be today, absent the legislative privilege. Whether or not such lawsuits are or were 
commonplace, however, the more important reason for applying a legislative privilege to all types 
of questioning is that American legislatures necessarily and routinely do make judgments that 
inevitably affect individual private citizens, many of whom will be just as unhappy with those 
judgments as they might have been with an adverse judicial resolution of some particular 
controversy. Moreover, because legislative judgments typically affect not just one party but 
thousands of citizens, the prospects that some unsatisfied individual will then attempt to seek relief 
personally from the decisionmaker in fact are dramatically enhanced.” Id. at 274, n.208. 
50. MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A 
litigant does not have to name members or their staffs as parties to a suit in order to distract them 
from their legislative work. Discovery procedures can prove just as intrusive.”). 
51. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
13 - Tyson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:40 PM 
1302 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1295 
 
of powers concerns, legislative independence is still threatened by the 
judiciary.52 “[W]hether a criminal action is instituted by the Executive 
Branch, or a civil action is brought by private parties, judicial power is 
still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative 
independence is imperiled.”53 It follows that regardless of whether the 
government or a private citizen initiates suit, legislative privilege applies 
to legislative acts.54 
C.  The U.S. Supreme Court Initially Construed the Privilege Broadly, 
but Narrowed Its Scope Significantly in the 1970s 
Early interpretations of the Speech or Debate Clause construed it 
broadly.55 Kilbourn v. Thompson56 defined what became the traditional 
scope of the legislative privilege:57 “[T]hings generally done in a session 
of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before 
it.”58 With this definition, the Court effectively hewed actions by 
legislators in two, creating distinct categories for Speech or Debate 
Clause purposes: (1) legislative, and (2) non-legislative action.59 
Building on this distinction, the Court has cautioned that not all 
conduct related to the legislative process is protected by the Speech or 
Debate Clause.60 Thus, the mere fact that “Senators generally perform 
                                                     
52. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503; United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If 
the Clause applies, it applies absolutely—there is no balancing of any interests nor any lessening of 
the protection afforded depending on the branch that perpetrates the intrusion.”); cf. Rayburn, 497 
F.3d at 658, 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the privilege prohibited any executive 
exposure to records of legislative acts, but that the judiciary could review evidence claimed to be 
privileged). 
53. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503. 
54. Id. 
55. Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 131 (“Coffin and Kilbourn 
established the broad principle that ‘speech or debate’ was to be given a somewhat expansive 
reading; actions within the scope of the legislative role were to be deemed within the ambit of the 
privilege.”). 
56. 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
57. Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 131. 
58. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204. 
59. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 315 (1973) (noting that while the Speech or Debate 
Clause protects members of Congress when they vote, it would not protect members carrying out 
nonlegislative acts like the Sergeant at Arms in Kilbourn when, at the direction of the House, he 
made an arrest that the courts found was made without authority). 
60. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S 501, 515 (1972). The Court also noted that “the Speech or 
Debate Clause does not prohibit inquiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some nexus to 
legislative functions.” Id. at 528. “The only reasonable reading of the Clause, consistent with its 
history and purpose, is that it does not prohibit inquiry into activities that are casually or incidentally 
related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative process itself.” Id. 
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certain acts in their official capacity” does not make those acts 
“legislative in nature.”61 In Gravel v. United States, the Court set forth 
the modern definition of what constitutes a legislative act: 
The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. 
Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they 
must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative 
processes by which Members participate in committee and 
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage 
or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other 
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of 
either House.62 
This definition significantly narrowed the scope of activities protected 
by the Clause.63 The Kilbourn definition used general language to 
delineate the Clause’s scope—“things generally done in a session of the 
House by one of its members in relation to the business before it”64—but 
the Gravel Court was careful to use more specific, detailed language in 
setting the Clause’s outer limits.65 The Gravel definition is now the 
authoritative standard for determining whether legislative action is 
privileged.66 
The Ninth Circuit, drawing on the language from Gravel, fashioned a 
two-part test for determining whether legislative privilege should apply 
to a given action.67 This characterization provides a useful analytical 
framework for applying the Gravel test, but does not purport to add or 
subtract anything from the substance of the test.68 The two prongs of the 
test are as follows: “First, it must be ‘an integral part of the deliberative 
and communicative processes by which Members participate in 
Committee and House proceedings.’ . . . Second, the activity must 
address proposed legislation or some other subject within Congress’ 
constitutional jurisdiction.”69 
                                                     
61. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). 
62. Id. 
63. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1118; Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative 
Immunity, supra note 27, at 146; Walker, supra note 28, at 377. 
64. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). 
65. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. 
66. See generally Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). 
67. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625). 
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Prior to United States v. Brewster70 and Gravel71—the two seminal 
legislative privilege cases decided in 1972—there had been only five 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions72 and few lower court decisions in which 
speech or debate questions were raised.73 Despite the relative dearth of 
case law, two patterns have emerged: first, the Court will not conduct a 
fact-specific inquiry on what constitutes a legislative act;74 second, 
circuit courts are currently split on whether there should be a 
nondisclosure privilege.75 
1.  The U.S. Supreme Court Will Not Conduct a Fact-Specific Inquiry 
in Determining What Constitutes a Legislative Act 
The somewhat formal distinction Gravel draws between legislative 
and non-legislative acts is important to preserving the legislative 
privilege.76 In drawing this distinction, the U.S. Supreme Court created a 
legal regime that helps avoid problematic fact-based inquiries.77 
Otherwise, each case would require a fact-specific inquiry, which would 
risk eviscerating the privilege altogether.78 For example, if a court could 
examine the motive behind legislative acts, then the Clause’s protection 
would be illusory because a litigant could circumvent the Clause merely 
by alleging an improper purpose;79 then, the privilege would not provide 
the protection for which it was designed,80 and improper motives would 
                                                     
70. 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
71. 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
72. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 
(1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Worth noting in Johnson—only the third time the 
Court had addressed the privilege—the Court wrote: “In part because the tradition of legislative 
privilege is so well-established in our polity, there is very little judicial illumination of this clause.” 
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179. 
73. See Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 129. 
74. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20 (3d ed. 2000). 
75. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rayburn 
House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir 2007) (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
76. See TRIBE, supra note 74, at § 5-20. 
77. Id. 
78. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 339 (1973). “Put simply, we’d better make sure we don’t so 
thoroughly question and probe each ‘speech or debate’ in assessing its privileged status that by the 
time the member’s ordeal is over, being told that the privilege applies after all would be 
anticlimactic.” TRIBE, supra note 74, at 1017. 
79. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508−09 (1975). 
80. Id. 
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be ascribed to legislative acts in “times of political passion.”81 For these 
reasons, the Court will not probe into an alleged improper purpose in 
determining whether an act is “legislative.”82 Furthermore, the Court will 
not balance the interests behind the privilege against the rights asserted 
by the opposing party.83 Where the privilege applies, it is absolute.84 
In recent years, the Court has provided some guidance as to what type 
of legislative action lies within the ambit of the Speech or Debate 
Clause.85 The Court has stated in dictum that members of Congress who 
intervene before executive agencies would not be protected by 
legislative privilege.86 Although not binding, the Court would likely 
follow this dictum because any intervention or attempt to influence an 
executive agency would contravene an original basis for the privilege: 
namely, separation of powers.87 Recognizing that the scope of the 
privilege is hazy, courts have often resorted to defining the privilege by 
what it does not cover rather than by what it does.88 
For example, taking a bribe is never considered a legislative act.89 
Other things not considered legislative acts include: “speeches delivered 
outside of the legislature; political activities of legislators; undertakings 
for constituents; assistance in securing government contracts; 
republication of defamatory material in press releases and newsletters; 
solicitation and acceptance of bribes; and criminal activities, even those 
committed to further legislative activity.”90 While there seems to be 
consensus regarding the above activities, the circuit courts have split on 
                                                     
81. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (cautioning that courts should not be in the 
business of determining motive). 
82. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966). 
83. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501, 509 n.16. 
84. Id. 
85. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10 
(1979). 
86. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172; see also Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121 n.10 (citing dictum in 
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1163. 
87. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164. 
88. United States v. Jefferson, 546 F.3d 300, 310 (4th Cir. 2008) (taking a bribe is never a 
legislative act); Irons v. R.I. Ethics Comm’n, 973 A.2d 1124, 1131 (R.I. 2009) (“Activities that 
remain unprotected by this immunity include, but are not limited to: speeches delivered outside of 
the legislature; political activities of legislators; undertakings for constituents; assistance in securing 
government contracts; republication of defamatory material in press releases and newsletters; 
solicitation and acceptance of bribes; and criminal activities, even those committed to further 
legislative activity.”). 
89. Jefferson, 546 F.3d at 310. 
90. Irons, 973 A.2d at 1131. 
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the question of how the Clause is applied,91 specifically, the question of 
whether the Clause contains a nondisclosure privilege.92 
2. Two Circuit Courts Have Split over Whether the Clause Contains a 
Nondisclosure Privilege and the U.S. Supreme Court Has Yet to 
Resolve the Split 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never spoken directly on the issue of 
whether the Clause includes a nondisclosure privilege.93 It is well 
established that the Speech or Debate Clause includes a use privilege.94 
In the context of the Speech or Debate Clause, a use privilege means that 
the executive or other litigant cannot use any evidence that came from a 
protected legislative act against a legislator in court.95 It is also well 
established that the Clause includes a testimonial privilege.96 Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken directly on whether the Clause 
includes a nondisclosure privilege, two circuit courts have.97 
The D.C. Circuit held that in both the civil and the criminal context, 
the Clause does include a nondisclosure privilege for documentary 
evidence that comes from or involves “legislative acts.”98 In Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,99 the D.C. Circuit held that the 
Clause includes a nondisclosure privilege.100 The court stated that 
nondisclosure is part of the privilege because “[d]ocumentary evidence 
can certainly be as revealing as oral communications—even if only 
indirectly when . . . the documents . . . do not detail specific 
                                                     
91. Compare United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir 2007), with 
United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). 
92. Compare Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660, with Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032. 
93. A nondisclosure privilege means that the executive or other litigant cannot force disclosure of 
evidence that may contain a legislative act unless a legislator consents to the search. Green, supra 
note 7, at 501. 
94. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). 
95. See Green, supra note 7, at 501; see also United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487 
(1979). 
96. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972); see Wells Harrell, Note, The Speech or 
Debate Clause Should Not Confer Evidentiary or Non-Disclosure Privileges, 98 VA. L. REV. 385, 
417 (2012). 
97. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032; Rayburn 497 F.3d at 660 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
98. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660; Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 415. 
99. 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
100. See id. at 420−21; see also Huefner, supra note 30, at 225 (“It is now well settled that 
the . . . Speech or Debate Clause protects both legislators and their staff from . . . document 
production . . . .”).  
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congressional actions.”101 The court emphasized that the purpose of the 
Clause was to prevent interference with legislative activity.102 Thus, the 
court concluded that plaintiffs could reach documentary material through 
direct suit or subpoena only if “the circumstances by which they come” 
are not considered within “‘legislative acts’ or the legitimate legislative 
sphere.”103 In United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,104 the 
D.C. Circuit reiterated that the Clause’s testimonial privilege extends to 
nondisclosure of written legislative materials.105 The Rayburn decision 
was not well received by legal academia.106 Scholarship criticizing the 
Rayburn decision was published quickly;107 however, none of the other 
circuits addressed the decision until 2011.108 
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with the D.C. Circuit, 
holding that the Clause did not contain an absolute nondisclosure 
privilege, even for documentary evidence that comes from or involves 
“legislative acts.”109 In United States v. Renzi,110 the Ninth Circuit 
refused to find that the Speech or Debate Clause contained a 
nondisclosure privilege in both civil and criminal discovery.111 In 
directly rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s position in Rayburn, the Ninth 
                                                     
101. Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420. 
102. Id. at 421. 
103. Id. 
104. 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir 2007). 
105. See id. at 660. Rayburn involved a search warrant of a congressperson’s office, whereas 
Brown & Williamson involved a subpoena to compel document disclosure. Brown & Williamson, 62 
F.3d 408. Despite these differences, Rayburn affirmed Brown & Williamson based on the same 
rationales. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (“[O]ur opinion in Brown & Williamson makes clear that a 
key purpose of the privilege is to prevent intrusions in the legislative process and that the legislative 
process is disrupted by the disclosure of legislative material, regardless of the use to which the 
disclosed materials are put.”).  
106. See Sarah Letzkus, Comment, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: The Speech or 
Debate Clause and Investigating Corruption in Congress, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1377 (2008); Recent 
Case, D.C. Circuit Holds that FBI Search of Congressional Office Violated Speech or Debate 
Clause—United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 121 
HARV. L. REV. 914 (2008); Brian Reimels, Note, United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 
Room 2113: A Midnight Raid on the Constitution or Business as Usual?, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 293 
(2007); James Walton McPhillips, Note, “Saturday Night’s Alright for Fighting”: Congressman 
William Jefferson, the Saturday Night Raid, and the Speech or Debate Clause, 42 GA. L. REV. 1085 
(2008). 
107. See sources cited supra note 106. 
108. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 
(2012). 
109. Id. at 1032. 
110. 651 F.3d 1012. 
111. Id.  
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Circuit made clear that preventing distraction to legislators was not the 
absolute purpose of the Clause.112 Further, the court concluded that the 
D.C. Circuit had prioritized protecting legislators from distraction 
without considering the legitimate counter interests in preventing illegal 
acts like corruption and bribery.113 The court stated that a correct 
interpretation of U.S. Supreme Court precedent reveals that “concern for 
distraction alone precludes inquiry only when the underlying action 
itself is precluded . . . .”114 Thus, Renzi affirmed the district court’s 
recognition that the privilege “is one of use, not non-disclosure.”115 
Despite the circuit split created by the Renzi decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to grant petition for certiorari.116 However, Renzi 
quickly generated positive responses from scholars.117 These scholars 
also criticized the Rayburn decision and the D.C. Circuit’s position that 
the Clause contains a nondisclosure privilege.118 
D.  While Most States Have a Version of the Federal Speech or Debate 
Clause, Many Have Interpreted Their Versions More Narrowly 
than the Federal Counterpart 
Forty-three state constitutions have some version of the Speech or 
Debate Clause,119 and the common law has also recognized a similar 
privilege.120 Twenty-three of the forty-three states have a constitutional 
provision that is essentially identical to the Federal Speech or Debate 
Clause.121 But many of the states that have considered the Clause have 
narrowly interpreted their own provisions, denying state legislators 
“protections that members of Congress would receive under the federal 
Speech or Debate Clause.”122 For example, two New York trial courts 
                                                     
112. Id. at 1034. 
113. Id.  
114. Id. at 1035 (emphasis in original). The court cited the following U.S. Supreme Court cases to 
illustrate this point: United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 480–81, 488 n.7 (1979); United States 
v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 173–77 (1966) (describing the Government’s investigation into actual 
legislation and other clear legislative acts); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18 (1972). 
Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036−37. 
115. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1018. 
116. Id. at 1034, cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012). 
117. See Harrell, supra note 96, at 385; Green, supra note 7, at 493. 
118. See sources cited supra note 117.  
119. See sources cited supra note 117. 
120. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). 
121. Huefner, supra note 30, at 236. 
122. Id. at 225. 
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held that their state version of the Speech or Debate Clause only 
protected legislators from liability, but not from being forced to answer 
questions about their work.123 Some states could justify this narrow 
construction based on different language in the state provisions, but the 
textual differences seem to be more indicative of stylistic preference 
rather than of substantive alteration.124 
Although some states have interpreted their own clauses narrowly, 
other states have little or no jurisprudence addressing their version of the 
Speech or Debate Clause.125 However, at least one scholar predicts that 
state courts will soon be forced to interpret the state versions of the 
Clause.126 Professor Huefner, who has published extensively on election 
law, predicts that disclosure suits will become more common in states.127 
He foresees these kinds of disclosure suits proliferating based on a 
number of developments, including: state legislatures becoming more 
professionalized combined with increasingly complex issues and more 
authority being accorded to state legislatures from Congress; a more 
litigious society that will seek to harass and burden legislatures based on 
political motivations; and finally, the trend towards more open 
government, exemplified by state copycat versions of the Freedom of 
Information Act as well as other “sunshine” laws.128 
Part II briefly describes the redistricting process, highlighting the role 
of Congress in that process. The reason for this shift in focus is to 
provide context for the substantive area in which courts will apply the 
preceding Speech or Debate Clause jurisprudence. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS CONGRESS AUTHORITY TO 
REGULATE CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 
While U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the Speech or Debate 
Clause have increased since the 1970s, the Court has never decided a 
Speech or Debate Clause case in the redistricting context. Yet 
                                                     
123. Abrams v. Richmond Cnty. S.P.C., 479 N.Y.S. 2d 624, 628 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Lincoln Bldg. 
Assocs. v. Barr, 147 N.Y.S. 2d 178, 182 (Mun. Ct. 1955). 
124. Huefner, supra note 30, at 239. 
125. Id. at 259. 
126. Id. at 260. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 226−27. State “sunshine” laws “requir[e] governmental bodies to give the public 
access to the decision-making process in the form of public meetings, so the citizenry can learn not 
only what decisions are made, but also why and how decisions are made.” Charles N. Davis et al., 
Sunshine Laws and Judicial Discretion: A Proposal for Reform of State Sunshine Law Enforcement 
Provisions, 28 URB. LAW. 41, 41 (1996). 
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redistricting litigation occurs routinely,129 and district courts will surely 
have to address Speech or Debate Clause issues in redistricting cases.130 
It is already very difficult for private litigants to prove wrongdoing, 
especially those alleging improper redistricting practices based on 
racially motivated decisionmaking.131 Litigants alleging racially 
motivated decisionmaking should know whether civil discovery in 
redistricting cases is a worthwhile avenue to pursue. 
Redistricting is intertwined with congressional activity.132 Members 
of the House of Representatives are elected based on where voters reside 
as determined by the redrawing of electoral lines, and Congress, acting 
as a body, has significant power to affect how redistricting occurs.133 
While the Constitution imposes some direct limitations on the final 
redistricting product,134 it also gives Congress power to affect the 
process and, ultimately, the outcome.135 
A.  Several Constitutional Provisions Govern Redistricting 
Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that 
“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several 
states . . . according to their respective numbers.”136 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has interpreted this Section to govern population equality for 
congressional redistricting.137 Congressional redistricting involves 
drawing districts from which members of the United States House of 
Representatives are elected.138 While Section 2 provides for equal 
reapportionment, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1—known as the Elections 
                                                     
129. Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 878, 879 
(2001). 
130. Id. See generally Order, supra note 18. As noted above, the Court has yet to resolve whether 
the Clause includes a nondisclosure privilege. With the ubiquity of email correspondence, it is easy 
to foresee similar factual scenarios as the one that arose in Perez v. Texas, making this analysis 
particularly timely. 
131. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
132. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
133. See sources cited supra note 132. 
134. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
135. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (elections for federal office); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; 
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
137. J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 4 (2d ed. 2010); see 
also Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
138. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: A PUBLIC INFORMATION 
MONOGRAPH 1 (1981). 
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Clause—gives Congress the ultimate authority to regulate federal 
elections.139 
The Elections Clause provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner 
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress 
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing Senators.”140 This Clause allows states, in the absence 
of congressional mandate, to regulate elections for federal office.141 If 
Congress enacts statutes that conflict with state regulations, federal law 
will prevail.142 Additionally, Congress may govern federal and state 
elections based on Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.143 
B.  Congressional Districts Must Be Reapportioned Equally and Are 
Regulated by Constitutional and Statutory Law 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the population of congressional 
districts in the same state must be as nearly equal in population as 
practicable.144 “[T]here are no de minimis population variations, which 
could practicably be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard 
of Art. I, § 2, without justification.”145 In other words, the state must 
prove that population variations could not have been reduced or 
eliminated by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population.146 
As noted above, Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires 
a congressional plan to comply with the “one person, one vote” 
principle;147 in addition, the Fourteenth Amendment extends the “one 
person one vote” requirement to legislative redistricting.148 The U.S. 
                                                     
139. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997).  
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
141. See Foster, 522 U.S. at 69. 
142. Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that “nothing in the language of that 
article gives support to a construction that would immunize state congressional apportionment laws 
which debase a citizen’s right to vote from the power of courts to protect the constitutional rights of 
individuals from legislative destruction.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
143. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
144. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8. 
145. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983). 
146. See id. at 739.  
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
148. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8; Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 733–
34 (1998). 
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Constitution also prohibits map drawers from purposefully 
discriminating against racial minorities.149 In theory, it does not allow 
redistricting maps to be the product of excessive political 
gerrymandering.150 Finally, the U.S. Constitution prohibits map drawers 
from “subordinat[ing] traditional race-neutral districting principles” to 
race-based districting principles.151 Federal statutory law imposes further 
restrictions. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)152 
prohibits a plan from resulting in the dilution of minority voting 
strength.153 Section 5 of the VRA prohibits a plan from reducing 
minority-voting strength relative to prior levels.154 Finally, a plan must 
use single-member districts.155 
The Equal Protection Clause has given states broader latitude in 
legislative redistricting.156 A state must make a good-faith effort to 
create districts that are as close to “equal population as is practicable.”157 
But, because the Court has recognized that it is “a practical impossibility 
to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number 
of residents, or citizens, or voters[,]” the Court allows states to deviate 
from the equal population ideal.158 A legislative apportionment plan is 
not facially invalid so long as the maximum population deviation falls 
below ten percent.159 And even if the range is more than ten percent, a 
state may be able to justify the inequality by proffering other legitimate 
objectives.160 Allowing states to justify deviations from equal population 
combats an “overemphasis on raw population figures” that could trample 
                                                     
149. See Karlan, supra note 148, at 733. 
150. Id.; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124–25 (1986).  
151. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Karlan, supra note 148, at 733. 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Congress enacted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act “to help 
effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment’s” suffrage protection. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152 
(1993). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any state or political subdivision from 
imposing any “voting qualification[s] or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement” of a United States citizen’s 
right to vote on account of race, color or status as a member of a language minority group. 42 
U.S.C. § 1973(a).  
153. See Karlan, supra note 148, at 733−34. 
154. See Karlan, supra note 148, at 734. 
155. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006); see Karlan, supra note 148, at 734. 
156. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973). 
157. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 
158. Id. 
159. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).  
160. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 324–25. The justification for the overall range exceeding ten percent in 
this case was a desire to respect the boundaries of political subdivision. Id. at 325. Another 
justification is to provide for “compact districts of contiguous territory.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578. 
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other factors that are important to acceptable reapportionment 
arrangement.161 
In spite of these substantive constraints—and the Voting Rights Act 
in particular—it is still very difficult for a plaintiff to prove that 
congressional redistricting was based on impermissible factors, such as 
racial animosity.162 As evidence of impermissible consideration, courts 
will rely on, among other things, “statements made by legislators and 
their staff.”163 But what if plaintiffs could no longer access these kinds of 
statements? How would plaintiffs prove intent to use impermissible 
factors such as racial animosity? These questions were implicated by a 
recent Texas case, Perez v. Texas, where members of Congress refused 
to disclose their written communications with Texas state legislators.164 
The Perez court’s order provided an excellent opportunity to define the 
contours of the Speech or Debate Clause in the redistricting context. 
III.  THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
PRIVILEGE IN THE REDISTRICTING CONTEXT WAS 
RECENTLY IMPLICATED BY PEREZ V. TEXAS 
Litigation has proliferated in recent redistricting cycles.165 Plaintiffs 
initiate redistricting suits for all sorts of reasons, including as a political 
maneuver to block plans that risk harming a political faction.166 
However, not all suits are political ploys: minority voters often bring suit 
when they feel that they have been discriminated against in the 
redistricting process.167 One such suit occurred in 2011 when a group of 
Hispanic voters from Texas initiated suit against Texas state legislators, 
alleging impermissible use of racial criteria in the redistricting 
process.168 During discovery, the plaintiffs requested that Texas state 
legislators disclose certain written communications.169 The request 
demonstrates the importance of defining the appropriate scope of the 
legislative privilege in the redistricting context. 
On August 5, 2011, members of the U.S. Congress submitted a 
                                                     
161. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973). 
162. HEBERT ET AL., supra note 137, at 63−64. 
163. Id. at 65. 
164. Order, supra note 18, at 3. 
165. Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, supra note 129, at 879.  
166. Id. at 879–80. 
167. See Plaintiff’s Response, supra note 17, at 5. 
168. Id. 
169. Order, supra note 18, at 3. 
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motion to prevent disclosure of written communication between 
themselves and certain Texas state legislators regarding the Texas state 
legislature’s redistricting.170 The plaintiffs, who were suing the Texas 
state legislators, had requested production of the written 
communications.171 The members’ legal theory for nondisclosure was 
that the communication was privileged under the Speech or Debate 
Clause.172 
In their motion, the members of the U.S. Congress stated that no court 
has ever forced a “sitting Member of Congress, their staff, or their 
counsel to submit to either deposition or production of documents in a 
redistricting case . . . .”173 Although the plaintiffs had requested 
production only from the Texas state legislators, the members of 
Congress argued that the nondisclosure privilege was absolute and thus 
barred production of privileged information no matter who was 
producing the information.174 The members argued that the reason why a 
court has never forced members of Congress to submit to discovery 
requests in a redistricting case is because “[e]very Member of Congress 
takes an interest in, and is affected by, redistricting, and as such it is an 
important part of congressional business.”175 
Next, the members of Congress cautioned the court that allowing the 
correspondence to be discovered would create an easy avenue for 
political opponents to use “compelled testimony of Members of 
Congress or production of their privileged communication with their 
constituent legislators” to work mischief.176 Specifically, the members of 
Congress were concerned that potential plaintiffs would use discovery to 
obtain political strategies.177 The members of Congress also feared that 
allowing their communication to be discoverable would have a “chilling 
effect” on Congress because its members would “not be able to have 
frank and honest communications with their constituent legislators 
regarding Congressional business.”178 
To illustrate that such a “chilling effect” was a real threat, the 
members of Congress noted that many of the same plaintiffs had sought 
                                                     
170. Id. at 3–4.  
171. Id. at 5. 
172. Id. at 3.  
173. Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 4. 
174. Id. at 3 n.7.  
175. Id. at 4. 
176. Id. 
177. Id.  
178. Id. 
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discovery from one of the same members in the previous redistricting 
cycle.179 The members of Congress also pointed out that the Texas 
District Court in that case had quickly quashed the plaintiffs’ 
subpoenas.180 The members of Congress also relied on a California case, 
Cano v. Davis.181 According to the members of Congress, an amicus 
brief filed in that case identified the problem with allowing 
communications between members of Congress and their constituent 
state legislators to be discovered: 
Parties to redistricting litigation will inevitably attempt to pry 
into politically sensitive discussions between Representatives 
and state legislators, other Members of Congress, constituents, 
party representatives and/or political consultants . . . . Worse, 
given the inherently political nature of redistricting litigation, 
plaintiffs unhappy with the outcome of the state legislative 
process may also seek to question Representatives to harass, 
embarrass or damage political opponents or other perceived 
beneficiaries of the redistricting legislation, or to obtain 
publicity for a political agenda . . . .182 
The Perez court denied the motion for nondisclosure.183 Relying on 
Gravel184 and Brewster,185 the court found that the communication 
between the members of Congress and their constituent legislators fell 
outside the ambit of the privilege.186 The court adopted the two-part test 
that the Ninth Circuit had formulated based on the Gravel test for 
determining which actions or activities qualify for the privilege.187 
“First, it must be ‘an integral part of the deliberative and communicative 
processes by which Members participate in Committee and House 
proceedings. Second, the activity must address proposed legislation or 
some other subject within Congress’ constitutional jurisdiction.’”188 To 
pass the Gravel test, a member of Congress must meet both of these 
                                                     
179. Id. at 5. The Congressman is Joe Barton. Id.  
180. Id.  
181. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 537 U.S. 1100 (2003). 
182. Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 5 (quoting Brief for Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenas 
Filed by U.S. Representatives Berman, Filner and Shennan, Cano, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208). 
183. Order, supra note 18, at 7. 
184. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
185. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
186. Order, supra note 18, at 5−6. 
187. See id. at 4–5 (citing Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
188. Id. at 4 (quoting Miller, 709 F.2d at 529). 
13 - Tyson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:40 PM 
1316 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1295 
 
requirements.189 
Here, the court determined that the members of Congress had failed 
both steps.190 First, the court stated that “[b]ecause . . . their legislative 
affairs are affected only incidentally,” and “because the communications 
[fell] outside of [their] sphere of legislative duties” the communications 
were not a part of the “‘deliberative and communicative process.’”191 
Second, the court stated that the communication did not involve 
“proposed legislation or some other subject within Congress’ 
constitutional jurisdiction.”192 
Additionally, the court analogized the factual scenario in Perez to two 
U.S. Supreme Court cases where the Court had noted that any attempt by 
the legislature to influence executive agencies would not be protected by 
legislative privilege.193 While the interaction in Perez was not factually 
identical, the court said that the principle from those cases is that the 
legislature cannot invoke the privilege when it discusses a matter outside 
of its jurisdiction and seeks “to influence the decisions of a state 
legislative body.”194 
IV.  THE PEREZ V. TEXAS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AND AFFECTS HOW 
FUTURE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WILL ASSERT THE 
PRIVILEGE IN REDISTRICTING CASES 
While this order from Perez v. Texas may seem like a small issue in 
what is a much larger redistricting case,195 the practical implications are 
                                                     
189. See Miller, 709 F.2d at 529. 
190. Order, supra note 18, at 5−6. 
191. Id. at 5 (quoting Miller, 709 F.2d at 529). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 5−6 (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10, 131 (1979); United States 
v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966)). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1163. 
Professor Reinstein and Silverglate propose arguments for why legislators intervening before 
executive agencies on behalf of their constituents may be a good thing. “It may be argued that there 
is a congressional role akin to that of an ombudsman with respect to executive agencies. With the 
tremendous growth of these federal agencies and the mushrooming number of bureaucrats, there is 
much to be said for Members of Congress using their influence to protect constituents from 
injustice. And the positive effects of such intervention on the workings of government go beyond 
relief for individual constituents who feel helpless when confronted with a gigantic bureaucracy; the 
intervening legislator is also in a position to help administrators keep in touch with popular opinion 
concerning the activities of their agency. In addition, studies of Congress attest generally to the 
fairly widespread nature of legislative intervention before executive agencies.” Id. at 1163–64 
(footnotes omitted). 
194. Order, supra note 18, at 6. 
195. Broadly stated, the issue in the case was “[w]hether Texas’ redistricting plan violates the 
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significant, and the order raises an important constitutional question: 
what is the appropriate scope of the legislative privilege in the 
redistricting context? The Perez court seemed sure that this 
communication was outside the modern version of the test.196 But the 
broad textual grant of Congress’s plenary authority over federal 
redistricting matters in the Constitution,197 along with the practical 
concerns highlighted by the members of Congress,198 indicates that this 
question deserves a more thorough analysis. 
Moreover, it is foreseeable that this issue will continue to arise in the 
context of suits where large groups of minority plaintiffs sue, alleging 
that redistricting committees have inappropriately re-drawn 
congressional districts in such a way that dilutes a group’s ability to elect 
a candidate of their choice. In fact, the Texas plaintiffs had sought 
discovery from one of the members of Congress named in this litigation 
in the previous redistricting cycle.199 
It is also foreseeable that members of Congress will continue to 
consult various individuals including state legislators who are in charge 
of re-drawing the district lines, and so, it is important that members of 
Congress understand whether those communications will be protected by 
legislative privilege. Framed more directly, are these communications 
“legislative acts” under the standard Gravel test? And, regardless of the 
answer to the first question, normatively, should they be protected by 
legislative privilege in light of the peculiarities of redistricting?200 Even 
if the act of communicating with certain individuals regarding 
redistricting is not considered a “legislative act,” questions linger. In 
fact, the way that the Texas court resolved this problem, while 
seemingly innocuous, could be potentially dangerous for future plaintiffs 
alleging impermissible gerrymandering.201 
                                                     
Constitution because it does not make a good faith effort to maintain population equality and treats 
inmates as residents of the counties in which they are incarcerated.” Ohio State Univ. Moritz 
College of Law, Perez v. Texas, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/PerezVTexas.php (last updated Oct. 3, 2012). 
196. See Order, supra note 18, at 3–6. 
197. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
198. See Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19. 
199. Id. at 5. 
200. What distinguishes redistricting from most other contexts in which these cases have taken 
place is Congress’s nearly plenary authority over redistricting matters. See supra Parts II & II.A. 
201. See infra Part VI. 
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A.  Members of Congress Might Use Other Arguments to Reach the 
Shelter of Legislative Privilege, Thereby Depriving Redistricting 
Plaintiffs of Access to Important Evidence 
The Texas court failed to foresee alternative ways that the members 
of Congress could have argued the motion, and in doing so, the court 
may have inadvertently encouraged members of Congress to exploit a 
gap in the “legislative acts” test. The members of Congress could have 
resorted to other arguments, especially in light of Congress’s broad 
authority over redistricting matters, to put themselves in what is clearly a 
protected category of the Speech or Debate Clause. To illustrate this, it is 
helpful to think about how these discovery requests could take place in 
future cases. 
Plaintiffs would first make a discovery request, asking the members 
of Congress to turn over correspondence. Then, the members of 
Congress would have a choice to make. They could try to do what the 
members of Congress in Perez v. Texas did by asserting that their 
communications constitute “legislative acts” and hope that another court 
is more sympathetic to their position. However, after Perez, a well-
advised member of Congress might take a different tack.202 
Instead, members of Congress might choose to link their activity to 
something that the U.S. Supreme Court has unequivocally stated is 
activity that falls within the legislative sphere. For instance, members of 
Congress in the process of investigating potential legislation are squarely 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.203 Future members of 
Congress could assert that they were investigating redistricting 
legislation and invoke their broad authority under Article I, Section 4 of 
the U.S. Constitution and the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments.204 That explanation should suffice to keep 
the communications sheltered under existing precedent, at least in a 
jurisdiction such as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
                                                     
202. Of course, other courts might have decided this differently, and so it is conceivable that 
members of Congress will continue to attempt this argument. However, because of the dearth of 
precedent in this area, a future court would almost surely consult the Texas court’s order as a source 
of guidance. 
203. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1975) (explaining that the 
privilege will attach when Congress investigates in a procedurally regular manner). 
204. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; 
see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
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which recognizes the nondisclosure privilege.205 
It is this possibility that makes the need to examine the scope of the 
Clause all the more acute. To that end, this Comment will first address 
the issue of whether the Clause should contain a nondisclosure privilege. 
Second, it will address whether the actions of the members of Congress 
in Perez v. Texas should fall within the modern articulation of the 
privilege. Third and finally, this Comment will examine redistricting and 
explore whether it warrants special treatment in light of Congress’s 
authority over regulating redistricting matters from Article I, Section 4 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
V.  A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH OR DEBATE 
CLAUSE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE CLAUSE SHOULD 
NOT CONTAIN AN ABSOLUTE NONDISCLOSURE 
PRIVILEGE 
As a threshold matter, it is important to first determine whether the 
Speech or Debate Clause contains a nondisclosure privilege, not just a 
testimonial privilege.206 It is important because if the Clause does not 
contain a nondisclosure privilege, then there is no basis to say that the 
Clause should shield all documentary evidence—containing or 
stemming from “legislative acts”—from discovery. This would help 
prevent members of Congress from exploiting the gap in the “legislative 
acts” test in the redistricting context because, even if they linked their 
activity to legitimate “legislative activity,” the documentary evidence 
could still at least be disclosed, if not necessarily used. However, if the 
Clause does contain an absolute nondisclosure privilege, at least in the 
redistricting context, members of Congress may be able to prevent 
almost all disclosure.207 
A.  Neither Distraction Concerns Nor Separation of Powers Concerns 
Support Incorporating an Absolute Nondisclosure Privilege into 
the Speech or Debate Clause 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never definitively stated that the Clause 
                                                     
205. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
206. There is some debate among the circuit courts over this issue. The D.C. Circuit held that the 
Clause does contain a nondisclosure privilege. Compare Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (citing Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), with United States v. 
Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (expressly disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit regarding 
the existence of a nondisclosure privilege), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012).  
207. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660; Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420−21.  
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includes a nondisclosure privilege;208 however, it has made clear that it 
will read the Clause “broadly to effectuate its purposes” and that the 
Clause’s purpose “is to insure that the legislative function the 
Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently.”209 
This language and U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggest that the Court 
will undertake a functional analysis.210 Congress could be impeded from 
performing its legislative function independently if plaintiffs could, as a 
matter of right, compel members of Congress to disclose documentary 
evidence stemming from “legislative acts.” As the members of Congress 
argued, having to respond to discovery requests from plaintiffs unhappy 
with the outcome of the state legislative process could be a major 
distraction.211 
However, the Renzi court took the position that distraction alone is 
not the only consideration when determining whether the privilege 
should attach unless the underlying action itself is barred.212 The Renzi 
court held that the Clause “does not blindly preclude disclosure and 
review by the Executive213 of documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence.”214 
Furthermore, in the redistricting context, as noted above, members of 
Congress could avoid disclosure through artful pleading that would 
place their activity within the “legislative activity” sphere.215 Limiting 
disclosure to non-legislative activities could run the risk of barring 
redistricting plaintiffs from accessing the information necessary to show 
impermissible gerrymandering.216 
Separation of powers is one of the bases for the Clause,217 and this 
concern is simply not acute in redistricting cases. This kind of case is 
                                                     
208. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660. 
209. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501−02 (1975). 
210. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 (1982). 
211. Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 5. 
212. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1035 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 
(2012). The court cited the following U.S. Supreme Court cases to illustrate this point: United States 
v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 480–81, 488 n.7 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18 
(1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 173–77 (1966) (describing the government’s 
investigation into actual legislation and other clear legislative acts). Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036−37. 
213. Renzi was a criminal case, and so the executive branch was involved. See 651 F.3d at 1018. 
However, based on the analysis in Part I.B, there is good reason to believe that Renzi’s reasoning 
applies in civil actions as well as criminal. 
214. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1037. 
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
216. Many of the same concerns have analogs in the criminal context. See Harrell, supra note 96, 
at 389−90. 
217. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164. 
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significantly different from the bribery and corruption cases that have 
recently been the subject of Speech or Debate Clause cases.218 In bribery 
and corruption cases, the executive branch investigates and potentially 
prosecutes legislators.219 That means that the executive branch will 
subpoena documents220 or acquire a search warrant.221 Then, members of 
the executive branch will review material that may or may not be 
legislative in nature.222 That scenario is perilous because of the 
separation of powers concerns—one of the Clause’s key rationales.223 
However, civil discovery is different. Plaintiffs can make discovery 
requests, but they cannot obtain search warrants.224 More importantly, 
plaintiffs seeking to show improper redistricting criteria represent a 
diminished threat to separation of powers. Private plaintiffs do not form 
a coequal branch of government, so there is little risk of encroaching on 
legislative independence. Of course, the power of the judiciary may be 
brought to bear on members of Congress, but only as a response to 
discovery requests initiated by a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.225 And 
yet, even in the criminal context, where separation of powers concerns 
are much more pronounced, the Ninth Circuit has refused to “blindly 
preclude disclosure.”226 This is because there are legitimate counter 
interests to the legislature’s need for independence.227 
The Renzi court identified crimes such as corruption and bribery that 
the executive branch would prosecute.228 While the bad acts are different 
in the civil context, they still present legitimate counter interests to the 
legislature preserving independence and avoiding distraction.229 In Perez 
                                                     
218. See, e.g., United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
219. See id. 
220. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 608–10 (1972). 
221. See, e.g., Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660. 
222. See, e.g., id. at 656−57. 
223. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164. 
224. See Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 4 (2008). 
225. For example, in Perez v. Texas, the plaintiffs made a discovery request, the members of 
Congress asserted legislative privilege as a basis for nondisclosure, and the court then issued a 
memorandum opinion compelling the members of Congress to disclose the requested material. See 
Order, supra note 18. Although separation of powers is still a concern when one branch exerts 
power against another branch, it is simply not an acute concern in this case because the judiciary 
cannot initiate a confrontation unilaterally. 
226. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 
(2012). 
227. See Harrell, supra note 96, at 404−05. 
228. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1020. 
229. Id. 
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v. Texas, for example, the plaintiffs had a legitimate interest in 
vindicating their voting rights.230 Proving intent to redistrict based on 
impermissible criteria is a difficult task,231 and if plaintiffs were 
precluded from this avenue because members of Congress were able to 
artfully plead that they were undertaking “legislative activity,” then it 
would be nearly impossible for plaintiffs to vindicate their voting 
rights.232 
Permitting documentary disclosure may not be appropriate for all 
forms of congressional activity, but redistricting simply does not 
implicate concerns that justify a nondisclosure privilege.233 To the 
contrary, the restrictions on impermissible redistricting practices should 
be vindicated by a transparent discovery process that allows plaintiffs to 
access the information they need to show impermissible 
gerrymandering. 
B.  Courts Should Apply Discovery Rules and Existing Privileges 
Instead of Resorting to a Nondisclosure Privilege 
Discovery rules can act as a check on plaintiffs who abuse the power 
to compel disclosure in redistricting cases. Although Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 34 does allow for broad disclosure, members of 
Congress will still have an opportunity to respond to inappropriate 
requests.234 Members of Congress may be concerned that plaintiffs will 
bring suit and seek discovery to pry into political strategy or just to 
block a redistricting plan based on partisan motives. The latter kind of 
suit happens anyway,235 and courts can act as discovery referees to 
ensure that plaintiffs are not abusing the discovery system. Courts 
should not hesitate to impose Rule 26(g)236 sanctions on plaintiffs who 
misuse this broad regime of disclosure. 
Moreover, members of Congress will still be protected by the use 
privilege237 and by the testimonial privilege of the Speech or Debate 
                                                     
230. See Order, supra note 18. 
231. HEBERT ET AL., supra note 137, 63−64. 
232. See supra Part II.B. 
233. Because separation of powers concerns are diminished in the civil context, and because 
pragmatic concerns—such as harassment and distraction—can be dealt with through other, less 
drastic means, redistricting does not merit a nondisclosure privilege.  
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
235. Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, supra note 129, at 879−80. 
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
237. Green, supra note 7, at 501. A use privilege, in the context of the Speech or Debate Clause, 
means that the Executive or other litigant cannot use any evidence that came from a protected 
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Clause.238 Even if plaintiffs gain access to documentary evidence 
stemming from legitimate “legislative acts,” if they try to use that 
evidence in impermissible ways, members may assert legislative 
privilege.239 If the documentary evidence does stem from “legislative 
acts,” then a court can prevent plaintiffs from using it as evidence, and 
can certainly prevent the evidence being used as the basis for liability.240 
Members of Congress may be generally concerned that the legislative 
process would run the risk of being disrupted.241 Of course, some 
plaintiffs will still probably find ways to abuse the system, but the 
current reality is that there is serious power asymmetry between 
members of Congress and many plaintiffs, especially minority groups.242 
Part of that asymmetry is deliberate, but only to the extent that it allows 
Congress to operate without fear of coercion from the other two 
branches of government243 and without distraction from legitimate 
legislative activity.244 This Comment’s proposed solution tries to level 
the playing field without sacrificing Congress’s independence or its 
ability to function properly. 
VI.  THE MODERN ARTICULATION OF A “LEGISLATIVE ACT” 
SHOULD NOT COVER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 
COMMUNICATING WITH STATE LEGISLATORS 
REGARDING REDISTRICTING 
The Clause’s underlying rationales and the realities of redistricting do 
not support including an absolute nondisclosure privilege, but it is still 
important to define the scope of the privilege in the event that others 
                                                     
legislative act against a legislator in court. Id.  
238. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1035 n.27 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 
1097 (2012).  
239. See Green, supra note 7, at 501. 
240. See Harrell, supra note 96, at 404−05.  
241. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“This 
compelled disclosure clearly tends to disrupt the legislative process: exchanges between a Member 
of Congress and the Member’s staff or among Members of Congress on legislative matters may 
legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the possibility of compelled disclosure may 
therefore chill the exchange of views with respect to legislative activity. This chill runs counter to 
the Clause’s purpose of protecting against disruption of the legislative process.”); MINPECO, S.A. 
v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A litigant does not have to 
name members or their staffs as parties to a suit in order to distract them from their legislative work. 
Discovery procedures can prove just as intrusive.”). 
242. See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 137, 63−64. 
243. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972). 
244. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). 
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disagree that the Clause is not one of nondisclosure. For example, the 
Texas court resolved the Perez dispute by resorting to the “legislative 
acts” test. While it is arguably a dangerous approach for future plaintiffs, 
it is nonetheless a predictable one. This section describes how the Perez 
v. Texas court applied the test, and argues that such an application could 
allow future members of Congress to exploit Speech or Debate Clause 
protection. 
The key question for the “legislative acts” test is this: to what extent 
will members of Congress be protected from disclosing documentary 
material? And, more specifically, to what extent—if any—will members 
be protected from disclosing documentary material relating to their 
involvement in congressional redistricting? For the legislative privilege 
to apply, the action “[f]irst . . . must be ‘an integral part of the 
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members 
participate in committee and House proceedings’ . . . . Second, the 
activity must address proposed legislation or some other subject within 
Congress’ constitutional jurisdiction.”245 As this Comment explains 
below, the activity in Perez v. Texas—based on how the members 
invoked the privilege—falls outside of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
However, if the members had asserted the privilege in a different 
manner, the court might have been bound to find that the members were 
acting “legislatively.” 
A.  Gravel Narrowed the Privilege’s Scope, but Failed to Provide 
Concrete Guidance 
When the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the legislative acts test in 
Gravel, it signaled a significant narrowing of the scope of the 
privilege.246 This definition is adequate for easy cases such as those 
involving formal action in official business, including “voting, 
conducting hearings, issuing reports, and issuing subpoenas.”247 But it 
does not resolve the lingering problems that arise when applying the 
privilege to new facts that do not, at first-glance, fall neatly within the 
categories of “legislative” or “non-legislative” action. 
The drawback to the Gravel test, and U.S. Supreme Court Speech or 
Debate Clause precedent generally, is that it does not provide much 
                                                     
245. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gravel, 408 
U.S. at 625). 
246. See Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 146; Reinstein & 
Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1118; Walker, supra note 28, at 377. 
247. Bastien v. Office of Campbell, 390 F.3d 1301, 1314 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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concrete guidance for interpreting the scope of the privilege in cases that 
are not factually on-point.248 Courts and scholars have tried to delineate 
the scope of the Clause by drawing on dicta from U.S. Supreme Court 
cases.249 However, since Gravel, the Court has had limited opportunities 
to apply the new test.250 While these few cases help to define the scope 
of the privilege by accretion, there is still substantial uncertainty. Each 
case has an episodic feel, as if there is no well-defined test that courts 
can readily apply to new factual scenarios.251 
B.  Future Courts May Find Communications Like Those in Texas v. 
Perez to Be “Legislative” in Nature 
The Perez court tried to draw on precedent to put flesh on the bare-
bones standards used by previous courts dealing with legislative 
privilege. It cites to cases involving members of Congress trying to 
influence executive agencies,252 and distills a principle from those cases: 
specifically, that the members of Congress “[had] discussed a matter 
outside of their jurisdiction” and had sought “to influence the decisions 
of the state legislative body.”253 This is a clever move by the court, and 
the court’s principle does have some appeal. But it is questionable 
whether the court’s reading of those cases really extends to the facts of 
Perez. 
In both Hutchinson v. Proxmire254 and United States v. Johnson,255 the 
Court stated in dictum that members of Congress who try to influence 
executive agencies would not be shielded by the Speech or Debate 
Clause.256 In those instances, the Court presumably would be concerned 
with separation of powers issues. But in the Texas redistricting case, the 
members of Congress were conferring with the state legislature.257 
                                                     
248. 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5675 (1992).  
249. Id. 
250. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 
U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 
(1972). 
251. 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 248, § 5675.  
252. Order, supra note 18, at 5–6 (citing Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121 n.10, 131; United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966)). 
253. Id. at 6.  
254. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
255. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). 
256. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121 n.10, 131; Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172. 
257. Order, supra note 18, at 3. 
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Unlike in Hutchinson and Johnson, there are no separation of powers 
concerns. There may be issues of federalism, but there is no evidence 
that the Speech or Debate Clause has roots in federalism similar to its 
roots in separation of powers.258 While the court’s argument has some 
appeal, it does not seem to square with the origins of the Speech or 
Debate Clause. 
Regardless of whether these cases were apposite, the Perez court was 
correct in finding that what the members of Congress claimed to be 
doing was not “legislative.”259 The correspondence with the Texas state 
legislators had nothing to do with any part of a house or committee 
proceeding, which is the first part of the two-part test fashioned by the 
Ninth Circuit. Also, the way the members argued for nondisclosure 
seems to fall outside of the second part of the test, which requires the 
activity to involve proposed legislation or some other subject within 
Congress’s constitutional jurisdiction. Even though Congress has broad 
constitutional authority to regulate redistricting, the members did not 
argue this point.260 Had they made that argument, the Perez court might 
have reached a different result. 
C. By Resorting to Gravel’s Legislative Acts Test, the Perez Court Left 
a Means by Which Future Members of Congress May Circumvent 
the Test 
Redistricting, as has been noted,261 is unique. Congress has a textual 
grant of authority to regulate election matters, which extends to 
redistricting.262 While that grant does not authorize members of 
Congress to try to persuade state legislators to redistrict based on 
impermissible criteria, such as racial animosity,263 it does create a sturdy 
hold to which members of Congress could link their activity to 
legitimate “legislative acts” and so invoke the protection of the Speech 
or Debate Clause. The members of Congress did not make that 
argument; instead, they seemed to rely on the lack of precedent and the 
future distractions that could ensue if the court did allow for 
disclosure.264 
                                                     
258. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164. 
259. Id. at 5−6. 
260. See Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 17. 
261. See supra Part II. 
262. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
263. See supra Part II.B. 
264. See Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 5. Additionally, the members of 
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Now that members of Congress know that the Texas court—and 
perhaps future courts—will reject arguments involving a lack of 
precedent and potential distraction, they will surely explore other 
options. One option mentioned above is to try to link redistricting to an 
activity that the U.S. Supreme Court has protected in no uncertain terms. 
Congress has a textual grant of authority to regulate redistricting 
matters,265 and it is foreseeable that Congress could use that authority to 
legislate in the area of redistricting. This means that the next time a 
scenario like the one in Texas takes place, members of Congress could 
instead explain that they were investigating potential redistricting 
legislation. 
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has squarely held that 
investigating potential legislation constitutes “legislative activity” for 
purposes of the legislative privilege.266 In fact, the Perez court, in 
denying the Congresspersons’ motion, explicitly stated that “[t]his was 
not proposed legislation or some other subject within Congress’ 
constitutional jurisdiction.”267 This adds support to the theory that if the 
members of Congress could have tied what they were doing to activity 
that the U.S. Supreme Court and the Constitution authorized them to do, 
then their correspondence would have been protected. 
D.  Even Though the Privilege “Breaks,” Plaintiffs Will Still Struggle 
to Obtain These Kinds of Communications Because of the State 
Versions of the Federal Speech or Debate Clause 
One solution to the potential problem of members of Congress 
evading disclosure through using the arguments discussed above is to 
obtain the information by forcing the other party to the 
communication—in the Perez case, the state legislators—to disclose. 
However, as noted earlier, most states have some kind of speech or 
debate clause that is more or less the same as the Federal Speech or 
Debate Clause.268 And although some states have interpreted their 
versions of the Clause more narrowly than have federal courts,269 
                                                     
Congress relied on the previous redistricting cycle when the same plaintiffs had sought discovery 
and the court had quashed those subpoenas, as well as the district court’s decision in Cano v. Davis, 
211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 537 U.S. 1100 (2003). Id. 
265. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
266. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504−05 (1975) (explaining that the 
privilege will attach when Congress investigates in a procedurally regular manner).  
267. Order, supra note 18, at 5. 
268. Huefner, supra note 30, at 224, 235–37. 
269. See id. at 259. 
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Professor Huefner has advocated for states to interpret their state 
versions to make them coextensive with the Federal Clause.270 
If states follow Professor Huefner’s advice, then the privilege would 
not actually “break” in practice. Instead, plaintiffs would be unable to 
access key information from either state legislators or members of 
Congress because both would likely be protected by the Clause. Of 
course, that is assuming that the state legislators would also assert the 
state privilege. Interestingly, in the Perez case, the Texas state legislators 
did not assert their state legislative privilege.271 
CONCLUSION 
While the seemingly narrow “legislative acts” test may seem to help 
plaintiffs, it could have the opposite effect in redistricting cases. If courts 
merely dispose of this issue by resorting to the standard “legislative 
acts” test, then they will incentivize legislators to give more artful 
explanations for why what they are doing constitutes a “legislative act.” 
And Congress’s entrenched authority over redistricting matters may 
leave future courts with no choice but to prevent disclosure.272 
To prevent that outcome, future courts should undertake the following 
analysis. First, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach and 
clarify that the Speech or Debate Clause does not contain an absolute 
nondisclosure privilege.273 By addressing this as a threshold matter, 
courts will obviate the need to use the “legislative acts” test until later. 
Second, courts should use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to filter 
out discovery requests not made in good faith. By using these rules, 
courts can protect members of Congress from being harassed by overly 
burdensome discovery requests. Third, if a litigant tries to use 
documentary evidence obtained through discovery, courts should then 
conduct the “legislative acts” test to determine whether the evidentiary 
privilege that is undoubtedly included within the Speech or Debate 
Clause prevents the litigant from using the documentary evidence in 
court. While members of Congress may face some increased distraction, 
courts should be well-equipped to ensure that plaintiffs are not making 
                                                     
270. See id. at 270. 
271. Order, supra note 18, at 5. 
272. In spite of Gravel’s narrowing language, the dearth of cases in which the test has been 
applied—coupled with their episodic feel—indicates, at best, that things remain uncertain. See 
supra Part IV.A. 
273. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 
(2012). 
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such requests only to harass and to delay. Whatever minor distress 
members of Congress undergo will be offset by the benefit to 
redistricting plaintiffs, and governmental transparency in general. 
 
